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The literature provides impressive evidence to show that no matter whether a company issues new shares
(Loughran and Ritter, 1995) or convertible preferred stocks (Abhyankar and Ho, 2006), or uses convertible
bonds (Lee and Loughran, 1998; Lewis et al., 2001), its post-reﬁnancing performance is signiﬁcantly inferior
to that of ﬁrms that undergo no reﬁnancing. In China, researchers have drawn a similar conclusion based on
the underperformance of reﬁnanced companies in a share-rationing scenario (Du and Wang, 2006). In China’s
special institutional environment, which is characterized by large shareholder control, and the particular path
by which companies gain listing status, researchers have further deduced that misappropriation is the major
motivation for the reﬁnancing behavior of Chinese listed ﬁrms (Li and Song, 2003).
Such a conclusion has very important social consequences. Misappropriation has become the accepted
explanation for the reﬁnancing behavior of Chinese listed companies. However, drawing this conclusion based
merely on the underperformance of post-reﬁnancing behavior is somewhat crude and worthy of further dis-
cussion. Admittedly, misappropriation-oriented reﬁnancing behavior results in a large amount of idle funds,
which increases the probability that a company will make ineﬃcient investments and engage in tunneling,
thereby leading to underperformance after reﬁnancing. However, it is worth noting that non-misappropria-
tion-oriented reﬁnancing behavior can also lead to underperformance. For example, according to pecking
order theory, in the face of ﬁnancing demands, companies will initially use internal funds and then consider
external ﬁnancing (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Spiegel and Tookes (2008) report that companies will ﬁrst choose
internal or private ﬁnancing to engage in innovative projects with high proﬁt potential and leave less innova-
tive and less proﬁtable projects for public reﬁnancing. Put diﬀerently, prior to reﬁnancing, a company’s prof-
itability has reached the peak of its particular commercial stage. As a result, even if companies devote all
outside funds to projects with a positive net present value, their proﬁtability is bound to decrease after reﬁ-
nancing (Clementi, 2002; Spiegel and Tookes, 2008).
Therefore, new research ideas are needed to help us to distinguish between possible motivations for the reﬁ-
nancing behavior of Chinese listed companies. It is noted in this paper that if planned reﬁnancing does not
become a reality, post-reﬁnancing performance depends on the initial motivation for reﬁnancing, i.e. misap-
propriation or the maximization of ﬁrm value. If a company reﬁnances for misappropriation purposes alone,
it is clearly not pursuing shareholder wealth maximization. Thus, if other conditions remain unchanged, then
the company’s performance would surely have been better if reﬁnancing had not taken place. If, in contrast,
the purpose of reﬁnancing is to maximize ﬁrm value, then the company’s performance would surely weaken if
it did not undertake reﬁnancing.
Unfortunately, there are no companies in which a planned reﬁnancing exercise both succeeds and fails,
meaning that it is impossible to know precisely what performance a company would exhibit if it did or did
not reﬁnance. However, the reﬁnancing approval system in China oﬀers us a unique research opportunity.
Under the terms of the system, a company cannot proceed with reﬁnancing, even if it is qualiﬁed to do so
and a general meeting of shareholders has voted in favor, until it has gained approval from the China Secu-
rities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). However, companies must wait a long time for the CSRC’s approval
(Cheung et al., 2009). During the long waiting period, many companies abandon their reﬁnancing plans for
such exogenous reasons as changes in national ﬁnancing policies, the implementation environment for the
planned fund-raising project and the target market environment. Thus, the CSRC approval system works
as an exogenous force dividing qualiﬁed companies with reﬁnancing intentions into two samples: a success
sample and a failure sample. The ﬁrms in the two samples are similar in a number of important respects, such
as performance, motivation and reﬁnancing methods. In other words, failed companies are the same as suc-
cessful companies apart from their failure to gain the CSRC’s approval for reﬁnancing.
This setting provides us with a natural laboratory in which to distinguish Chinese listed companies’ moti-
vations for reﬁnancing behavior. Because the expectations for a ﬁrm’s post-reﬁnancing performance are highly
dependent on its motivation for reﬁnancing, we can judge whether that motivation is misappropriation by
comparing the subsequent performance of successful and failed companies. More speciﬁcally, if the post-
reﬁnancing performance of successful companies is signiﬁcantly inferior to that of failed companies, then
non-reﬁnancing improves their performance and we can infer that their main purpose in reﬁnancing was to
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signiﬁcantly better than that of the failure sample, then non-reﬁnancing weakens ﬁrm performance. If this
is indeed the case, then the implication is that Chinese listed ﬁrms do not engage in reﬁnancing behavior
for misappropriation purposes alone. Rather, such behavior is more likely to be a rational choice made in full
consideration of the costs and beneﬁts.
Using data from the Chinese A-share market during the 1998–2011 period, we show that Chinese listed
companies’ reﬁnancing behavior cannot be explained by misappropriation alone. We ﬁnd that in the 3 years
following a reﬁnancing exercise, the performance of ﬁrms in the success sample is signiﬁcantly better than that
of ﬁrms in the failure sample. The results remain robust to the use of various performance indicators, control-
ling for the potential inﬂuence of corporate governance and the possible omission of variables, shortening the
comparison period and removing the possible inﬂuence of earnings management. In addition, a further test
shows that companies with lower agency costs and larger ﬁnancing constraints display greater post-reﬁnancing
performance diﬀerences. These results indicate that on the whole, Chinese listed ﬁrms do not engage in reﬁ-
nancing behavior solely for misappropriation purposes. Rather, reﬁnancing appears to be a rational decision
made in full consideration of the costs and beneﬁts.
This paper’s contributions lie in two major areas. First, the paper oﬀers new research ideas that allow fresh
judgment of the proposition that the reﬁnancing behavior of Chinese listed companies can be explained by
misappropriation alone. We argue that post-reﬁnancing performance is highly dependent on the initial moti-
vation for reﬁnancing. The natural laboratory provided by China’s reﬁnancing approval system allows us to
obtain evidence to show that the country’s listed ﬁrms do not engage in reﬁnancing behavior solely for reasons
of misappropriation. We believe that the ﬁndings of this paper oﬀer a new perspective on, and a deeper and
more comprehensive understanding of, companies’ reﬁnancing behavior. We also resolve some of the endog-
enous self-selection problems suﬀered by earlier reﬁnancing studies (Stulz, 1990; Li and Zhao, 2006).
Second, the paper oﬀers solutions to the “reﬁnancing puzzle” that has long been the subject of heated
debate in ﬁnance research (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Allen and Soucik, 2008). Traditional explanations,
such as the window of opportunity, free cash ﬂow and earnings management hypotheses, are all based on
shareholder–manager/principal-agent theory, which are grounded in Berle and Means (1932) well-known sup-
position that the separation of control and management rights is strongly enforced in modern companies, a
supposition that Holderness (2009) has questioned. New theoretical research shows that the reﬁnancing puzzle
is probably the result of rational decisions made by devoted managers (Clementi, 2002; Spiegel and Tookes,
2008) and empirical research carried out in the United States has provided evidence in support of this argu-
ment (Chemmanur et al., 2010). In this paper, we show that the reﬁnancing behavior of Chinese listed com-
panies is likely to be a rational choice made in full consideration of the costs and beneﬁts, thus oﬀering further
support for the foregoing argument backed up by empirical evidence from the world’s largest emerging market
and transitional economy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the research design and Section 3
reports and analyzes the empirical results. Section 4 considers and tests alternative explanations. Section 5
examines the relationship between agency costs and ﬁnancial constraints and cross-sectional diﬀerences in per-
formance to provide further evidence for our inferences. Section 6 oﬀers concluding remarks, including a dis-
cussion of the paper’s policy implications.2. Research design
2.1. Sample selection and data sources
Our original sample includes all companies on the Chinese A-share market that intended to reﬁnance and
whose reﬁnancing projects had received a vote of approval in general meetings of shareholders during the
1998–2008 period. As our regression analysis requires the use of data for the three-year period after reﬁnanc-
ing, our research period covers the 13 years from 1998 to 2011. The following screening procedures were per-
formed sequentially. We ﬁrst removed companies belonging to the ﬁnancial industry. Then, to eliminate the
potential eﬀects of two adjacent reﬁnancing projects, we also removed companies that formulated a second
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we further required that there be no necessary data missing for each observation for the 3 years following a
successful or failed reﬁnancing attempt. The ﬁnal sample used in the regression analysis includes 454 ﬁrms,
296 in the reﬁnancing success sample and 158 in the failed sample, over 3 years, for a total of 1362 ﬁrm-year
observations. To minimize the inﬂuence of outliers, we winsorized all continuous variables at the top and bot-
tom 1% levels.
Information on the sample companies’ reﬁnancing plans and implementation was obtained from the
WIND database, and all other data was obtained from the China Securities Market and Accounting Research
(CSMAR) database. In the case of any questionable data, we relied on the China Center for Economic
Research (CCER), WIND and CSMAR databases for cross-checking.
2.2. Models and variable deﬁnitions
We adopt 3 years post-reﬁnancing as our comparison benchmark and use the following basic regression
model, Model (1), to investigate the diﬀerences in performance between the success and failure samples.Perf ¼ a0 þ a1  Sucþ aj 
X
Controli;t þ fixed effectsþ n ð1Þ
where Perf stands for ﬁrm performance, which we measure by net income on sales, assets and equity. To min-
imize the inﬂuence of extraordinary item manipulation, we also adopt return on sales, assets and equity as
indicators of ﬁrm performance. The key explanatory variable in Model (1), Suc, is a dummy used to divide
the sample. It takes a value of 1 if the ﬁrm belongs to the success sample, and 0 otherwise. Our main concern
is the sign and statistical signiﬁcance of Suc’s estimation coeﬃcient, a1. In line with our discussion in the intro-
duction, if a1 is signiﬁcantly negative, the implication is that companies reﬁnance primarily for misappropri-
ation. If a1 is signiﬁcantly positive, company reﬁnancing behavior is unlikely to be for misappropriation
purposes alone, but instead a rational choice made in full consideration of the costs and beneﬁts.
In addition, factors such as ﬁrm size, risk and growth are likely to aﬀect both a company’s performance and
its reﬁnancing behavior. We thus control for these factors, following Chen et al. (2007). Size is measured by
the natural logarithm of a company’s total assets, growth by the growth rate of sales revenue and risk by the
annual beta coeﬃcient calculated by the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Finally, we also control for
ﬁxed year and industry eﬀects and, in line with Petersen (2009) suggestion, take advantage of a modiﬁed clus-
ter approach to control for the possible time eﬀects resulting from the cross-sectional correlation of the obser-
vations from diﬀerent years in the same sample. The deﬁnitions of the main variables in Model (1) are
presented in Table 1.Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable
name
Deﬁnition
ROS Net income on sales
adj_ROS Return on sales
ROA Net income on assets
adj_ROA Return on assets
ROE Net income on equity
adj_ROE Return on equity
Suc =1 if the ﬁrm belongs to the success sample, and 0
otherwise
Size Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the year
Risk Annual beta coeﬃcient calculated by the Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock exchanges
Grow Growth rate of sales revenue
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3.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics. Panel A reports the descriptive features of the main variables. The
diﬀerences between the mean and median values are small for all variables, which indicates that the outlier
problem was largely resolved through winsorization. Judging from the standard deviations, the greatest var-
iation is in size and growth, with the six performance indicators varying slightly, which indicate that although
the sample companies display considerable diﬀerences in size and growth, they share important similarities in
terms of performance. Panel B is the correlation coeﬃcient matrix. Both the Pearson and Spearman correla-
tion coeﬃcients show the six performance indicators to have a signiﬁcant positive correlation with Suc. It can
thus be preliminarily concluded that the performance of the success sample ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly better than
that of those in the failure sample in the 3 years after reﬁnancing, which indicates that misappropriation is
not the sole reason for reﬁnancing.3.2. Regression analysis
Table 3 reports the regression results for the basic model, Model (1). Net income on sales, net income on
assets, net income on equity, return on sales, return on assets and return on equity are used as the dependent
variables describing ﬁrm performance in regressions (1)–(6). Although we adopt six diﬀerent proxies for per-
formance, the ordinary least squares (OLSs) results are almost the same, which indicates that our analysis is
relatively robust. In Table 3, Suc, the dummy variable used to divide the sample, is signiﬁcantly positive, which
again shows that the performance of the successful ﬁrms is superior to that of their failed counterparts in the
3 years after reﬁnancing. Hence, our regression results show that companies’ reﬁnancing behavior is notTable 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variable N Mean Median Standard deviation
Panel A: Descriptive features
ROS 1362 0.0667 0.0578 0.1800
adj_ROS 1362 0.0734 0.0649 0.1770
ROA 1362 0.0311 0.0297 0.0552
adj_ROA 1362 0.0362 0.0336 0.0605
ROE 1362 0.0584 0.0620 0.1300
adj_ROE 1362 0.0711 0.0704 0.1320
Suc 1362 0.6520 1.0000 0.4760
Size 1362 21.5500 21.4300 0.9800
Risk 1362 0.9990 1.0300 0.2190
Grow 1362 0.2870 0.1510 0.7690
ROS adj_ROS ROA adj_ROA ROE adj_ROE Suc
Panel B: Correlation coeﬃcient matrix
ROS 0.9258*** 0.7895*** 0.6941*** 0.6149*** 0.5850*** 0.1369***
adj_ROS 0.9375*** 0.7544*** 0.7828*** 0.6349*** 0.6180*** 0.1418***
ROA 0.7910*** 0.7584*** 0.9290*** 0.7654*** 0.7531*** 0.1315***
adj_ROA 0.7316*** 0.8060*** 0.9398*** 0.7528*** 0.7777*** 0.1405***
ROE 0.6674*** 0.6597*** 0.8838*** 0.8492*** 0.8579*** 0.0826***
adj_ROE 0.6287*** 0.6865*** 0.8411*** 0.8876*** 0.9254*** 0.0698**
Suc 0.1690*** 0.1692*** 0.1362*** 0.1392*** 0.0604** 0.0496*
In the correlation coeﬃcient matrix, the upper triangular matrix presents Pearson correlation coeﬃcients and the lower triangular matrix
presents Spearman correlation coeﬃcients.
* Signiﬁcance at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1% level.
Table 3
Performance comparison of successful and failed reﬁnancing companies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ROS adj_ROS ROA adj_ROA ROE adj_ROE
Suc 0.0586*** 0.0507*** 0.0162*** 0.0163*** 0.0243*** 0.0206**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.009) (0.047)
Size 0.0114 0.0220*** 0.0054** 0.0089*** 0.0214*** 0.0221***
(0.106) (0.003) (0.024) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Grow 0.0380*** 0.0322*** 0.0111*** 0.0124*** 0.0277*** 0.0276***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Risk 0.1055*** 0.1019*** 0.0635*** 0.0661*** 0.0997*** 0.1319***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.1052 0.3498** 0.0385 0.1232** 0.3400*** 0.3550***
(0.455) (0.022) (0.431) (0.029) (0.002) (0.001)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
N 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362
adj. R2 0.127 0.129 0.155 0.164 0.140 0.165
All of the continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% levels, and both White’s heteroskedasticity–robust procedure and
the cluster correction method are used. No collinearity problems are observed.
* Signiﬁcance at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1% level.
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Although the results in Table 3 show the performance of the success sample to be signiﬁcantly better than
that of the failure sample in the three-year period following reﬁnancing, this superior performance may merely
be the result of the more established corporate governance enjoyed by the ﬁrms in this sample. To eliminate
this possibility, we also take the eﬀects of corporate governance into consideration. We add the ownership
properties of the ultimate controlling shareholder, ownership concentration, board independence and chair-
man–CEO duality as variables in Model (1), and repeat the analysis. Table 4 presents the regression results.
It shows that after controlling for these corporate governance variables, there is no substantive change in the
results of the previous tests. Suc remains signiﬁcantly positive in all six regressions.
In the Tables 3 and 4 tests, net income on sales, net income on assets, net income on equity, return on sales,
return on assets and return on equity, which we adopt to describe ﬁrm performance, are all traditional mea-
sures with a common defect. That is, they neglect the cost of equity capital and thus they may fail to measure
exactly how much value a company creates for its shareholders. The economic value added (EVA) method
addresses this defect to some extent. Because the EVA method calculates gains with all capital costs elimi-
nated, it is more likely than other methods to reﬂect how much value a company creates for its shareholders.
In fact, since Stern et al. (1995) ﬁrst proposed the EVA method, it has become the most popular mixed-per-
formance measurement tool (Richard et al., 2009). Accordingly, we also use EVA as a performance proxy to
implement our robustness test. EVA equals a company’s net operating income before interest and after taxes
minus the product of its debt plus its market value and weighted average cost of capital (WACC). In calcu-
lating a ﬁrm’s WACC, we use the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to obtain its cost of equity capital.
Finally, we use the absolute value of EVA thus calculated divided by a company’s total assets, annual sales
revenue and equity, thereby obtaining the EVA on assets (evaoa), sales (evaos) and equity (evaoe).
We then use evaoa, evaos and evaoe as dependent variables to conduct robustness tests, the results of which
are presented in Table 5. Regressions (1), (2) and (3) repeat the tests of the basic regression model, Model (1),
and regressions (4), (5) and (6) control for the eﬀects of corporate governance. As we can see from Table 5,
when we use EVA to measure ﬁrm performance, the key explanatory variable, Suc, is still signiﬁcantly greater
Table 4
Controlling the inﬂuence of corporate Governance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ROS adj_ROS ROA adj_ROA ROE adj_ROE
Suc 0.0611*** 0.0497*** 0.0171*** 0.0165*** 0.0261*** 0.0201*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.055)
Size 0.0088 0.0223*** 0.0045* 0.0085*** 0.0198*** 0.0225***
(0.258) (0.006) (0.077) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Grow 0.0329*** 0.0267*** 0.0089*** 0.0100*** 0.0223*** 0.0217***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Risk 0.1099*** 0.0992*** 0.0676*** 0.0664*** 0.1013*** 0.1357***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Owner 0.0232 0.0246* 0.0142*** 0.0167*** 0.0291*** 0.0393***
(0.126) (0.097) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000)
Con1 0.0829* 0.0939** 0.0384*** 0.0471*** 0.0833*** 0.0915***
(0.052) (0.031) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Did 0.0764 0.1299 0.0403 0.0509 0.0263 0.0794
(0.519) (0.289) (0.252) (0.185) (0.722) (0.300)
Dual 0.0139 0.0227 0.0040 0.0063 -0.0027 0.0013
(0.499) (0.292) (0.526) (0.408) (0.836) (0.922)
Constant 0.0349 0.3945** 0.0122 0.1316** 0.2784** 0.3385***
(0.835) (0.028) (0.820) (0.033) (0.029) (0.008)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
N 1041 1041 1041 1041 1041 1041
adj. R2 0.149 0.155 0.179 0.190 0.150 0.187
In this table, owner stands for the ownership properties of the ultimate controlling shareholder. It takes a value of 1 if the sample ﬁrm
belongs to a state-owned enterprise (SOE), and 0 otherwise. Con1 stands for ownership concentration and is measured by the ownership
percentage held by the top shareholder. Did represents board independence and is equal to the proportion of independent directors on the
board. Dual depicts chairman-CEO duality and takes a value of 1 if the chairman and CEO are the same person, and 0 otherwise.
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% levels, and both White’s heteroskedasticity–robust procedure and the
cluster correction method are used. Collinearity problems are not a concern. Because corporate governance data is missing for some ﬁrms,
the number of observations in the regressions decreases to 1041.
* Signiﬁcance at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1% level.
C. Liu, L. Sun / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 307–320 313than zero in all six regressions, which indicates that the eﬃciency of the successful ﬁrms’ value-creation is also
superior to that of their failed counterparts in the post-reﬁnancing period.
Although we control for the inﬂuence of corporate governance in the tests reported in Tables 4 and 5, the
omitted variable problem may still exist. To reduce these concerns, we also use the panel regression method to
reduce estimation and testing problems (Bhattacharya et al., 2003). Table 6 presents the panel regression
results. Because there was no change in the value of Suc, the key explanatory variable, during the research
period, we use random eﬀects in the panel regressions. It can be seen from Table 6 that the estimation
coeﬃcient of Suc remains signiﬁcantly positive in all six regressions. This ﬁnding indicates that the omitted
variable problem has little inﬂuence on the regression results and further proves our conclusion that the
post-reﬁnancing performance of the success sample is signiﬁcantly better than that of the failure sample.
Finally, we also change the criteria for the comparison period. In the previous tests, we compare the sample
companies’ performance in the 3 years following a successful or failed reﬁnancing attempt. If this comparison
period is too long, the test results may contain too much noise. To alleviate such fears, we reduce the compar-
ison period to 2 years and 1 year after reﬁnancing and re-implement the Model (1) test. Table 7 reports the
results. Regressions (1)–(3) are based on a two-year comparison period, and regressions (4)–(6) on a one-year
comparison. Table 7 shows that a reduction in the comparison period has no eﬀect on the results. Suc remains
signiﬁcantly positive in all six regressions, which indicates that our conclusion concerning the superior perfor-
mance of the success sample is not dependent on the length of the comparison period.
Table 5
EVA as a measure of ﬁrm performance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
evaoa evaos evaoe evaoa evaos evaoe
Suc 0.0157*** 0.0596*** 0.0196** 0.0167*** 0.0625*** 0.0216**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025)
Size 0.0064** 0.0142* 0.0218*** 0.0054** 0.0114 0.0206***
(0.010) (0.056) (0.000) (0.035) (0.159) (0.001)
Grow 0.0113*** 0.0400*** 0.0294*** 0.0090*** 0.0347*** 0.0239***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Risk 0.0622*** 0.1018*** 0.1006*** 0.0662*** 0.1053*** 0.1021***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Owner 0.0136*** 0.0200 0.0297***
(0.004) (0.200) (0.004)
Con1 0.0365*** 0.0776* 0.0710***
(0.008) (0.091) (0.010)
Did 0.0454 0.0864 0.0055
(0.217) (0.489) (0.949)
Dual 0.0024 0.0059 0.0037
(0.733) (0.802) (0.789)
Constant 0.0601 0.1697 0.3491*** 0.0369 0.1079 0.2923**
(0.236) (0.258) (0.003) (0.505) (0.544) (0.033)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
N 1362 1362 1362 1041 1041 1041
adj. R2 0.144 0.123 0.127 0.162 0.139 0.131
All of the continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% levels, and both White’s heteroskedasticity–robust procedure and
the cluster correction method are used. Collinearity problems are not a concern. Because corporate governance data is missing for some
ﬁrms, the number of observations in regressions (4)–(6) decreases to 1041.
* Signiﬁcance at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1% level.
314 C. Liu, L. Sun / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 307–3204. Alternative explanations
4.1. Pre-reﬁnancing performance diﬀerences
The requirements of the CSRC approval system stipulate that a listed company may reﬁnance only if its
performance reaches a certain threshold. Hence, whether the companies in our sample succeeded or failed
in their reﬁnancing approval application, their performance must have reached or exceeded that threshold
during the reﬁnancing application period, thereby ensuring their comparability for the purposes of this study.
However, if it were instead the case that the ﬁrms in the success sample exhibited superior performance to
those in the failure sample prior to the reﬁnancing application, then our conclusions would be invalid. To alle-
viate fears over this alternative explanation, we also carry out tests to screen the ﬁrms. On the basis of our
original observations, we create panel data to compare the ﬁrms’ performance in the 3 years before reﬁnancing
and rerun the basic regression, Model (1), ensuring that no data are missing for this period. The ﬁnal sample
for this regression contains 3 years of data on 112 successful ﬁrms and 111 failed ﬁrms, for a total of 669 ﬁrm-
year observations.
Table 8 reports the results of this robustness test. The dependent variables used in regressions (1)–(6) to
describe ﬁrm performance are net income on sales, net income on assets, net income on equity, return on sales,
return on assets and return on equity, as in the previous tests. Table 8 shows that Suc, the dummy variable
used to divide the sample, is not statistically signiﬁcant in any of the six regressions, which is consistent with
our assumption that prior to reﬁnancing, the two types of companies exhibited no signiﬁcant performance dif-
ferences. Hence, our previous conclusions are valid.
Table 6
Panel Regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ROS adj_ROS ROA adj_ROA ROE adj_ROE
Suc 0.0622*** 0.0472*** 0.0169*** 0.0151*** 0.0257*** 0.0194**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.006) (0.044)
Size 0.0069 0.0231*** 0.0033 0.0083*** 0.0196*** 0.0217***
(0.351) (0.002) (0.166) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Grow 0.0224*** 0.0193*** 0.0084*** 0.0102*** 0.0229*** 0.0225***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Risk 0.1099*** 0.0931*** 0.0593*** 0.0536*** 0.0982*** 0.1302***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Owner 0.0209 0.0229* 0.0115*** 0.0140*** 0.0280*** 0.0365***
(0.129) (0.094) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
Con1 0.0744* 0.1082*** 0.0362*** 0.0527*** 0.0883*** 0.0949***
(0.077) (0.010) (0.007) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
Did 0.0291 0.1043 0.0117 0.0288 0.0202 0.0583
(0.785) (0.318) (0.725) (0.424) (0.791) (0.451)
Dual 0.0097 0.0179 0.0022 0.0048 -0.0038 0.0018
(0.576) (0.291) (0.679) (0.409) (0.759) (0.887)
Constant 0.0112 0.4011** 0.0020 0.1392** 0.2764** 0.3344***
(0.947) (0.017) (0.971) (0.018) (0.014) (0.004)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
N 1041 1041 1041 1041 1041 1041
adj. R2 0.1743 0.1792 0.2007 0.2085 0.1784 0.2139
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% levels, and both White’s heteroskedasticity–robust procedure and the
cluster correction method are used. Collinearity problems are not a concern. Because some of the corporate governance data is missing, the
number of observations in the regressions decreases to 1041.
* Signiﬁcance at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1% level.
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Another alternative explanation for our ﬁndings is that Chinese regulators are able to discriminate compa-
nies characterized by a high level of earnings management from those that legitimately want to reﬁnance
(Chen and Yuan, 2004). Accordingly, they can force the former to abandon their reﬁnancing plans. If this
is the case, companies with a high level of earnings management are more likely to be included in the failure
sample. In addition, the reversal eﬀects of earnings management are certain to lead to a greater decline in per-
formance among these ﬁrms, and thus the performance of ﬁrms in the success sample would be signiﬁcantly
better in comparison.
To determine the veracity of this alternative explanation, we also investigate the diﬀerences in earnings
management between the two types of companies in the 3 years prior to reﬁnancing. We use the same sample
as that in Section 4.1 and measure earnings management using the basic Jones model and modiﬁed KS model,
as suggested by Xia (2003). Table 9 presents the results. Regressions (1) and (2) report the OLS results with
EMJS and EMKS serving as the dependent variables, referring to earnings management calculated using the
basic Jones model and modiﬁed KS model, respectively. Regressions (3) and (4) are the Logit regression
results. The dependent variable used in these regressions is a dummy variable adopted to show whether a com-
pany has adjusted its earnings upward. EMJS_d or EMKS_d equals 1 if EMJS or EMKS is greater than zero,
and 0 otherwise. The results show that Suc lacks statistical signiﬁcance in all four regressions, indicating that
there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in earnings management between the two types of ﬁrms in the pre-
reﬁnancing period. Compared with their successful counterparts, the failed ﬁrms exhibit neither greater
upward adjustments in earnings nor any greater ability to engage in such adjustments. Hence, this alternative
Table 7
Reduction in comparison period.
Two years after successful or failed reﬁnancing One year after successful or failed reﬁnancing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE
Suc 0.0636*** 0.0188*** 0.0363*** 0.0863*** 0.0251*** 0.0487***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008)
Size 0.0096 0.0050* 0.0234*** -0.0003 0.0032 0.0239**
(0.278) (0.073) (0.000) (0.979) (0.375) (0.023)
Grow 0.0490*** 0.0147*** 0.0348*** 0.0579*** 0.0139*** 0.0337***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Risk 0.0855*** 0.0540*** 0.0624*** 0.0622 0.0499*** 0.0270
(0.005) (0.000) (0.003) (0.116) (0.000) (0.418)
Constant 0.0849 0.0400 0.4218*** 0.0141 0.0230 0.4974**
(0.637) (0.485) (0.003) (0.958) (0.775) (0.031)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
N 908 908 908 454 454 454
adj. R2 0.148 0.160 0.129 0.167 0.157 0.123
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% levels, and both White’s heteroskedasticity–robust procedure and the
cluster correction method are used. No collinearity problems are observed.
* Signiﬁcance at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1% level.
Table 8
Pre-reﬁnancing performance diﬀerences.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ROS adj_ROS ROA adj_ROA ROE adj_ROE
Suc 0.0062 0.0160 0.0028 0.0085 0.0360 0.0336
(0.786) (0.434) (0.815) (0.366) (0.202) (0.163)
Size 0.0299 0.0255* 0.0157 0.0124 0.0305* 0.0386***
(0.113) (0.094) (0.213) (0.165) (0.082) (0.010)
Grow 0.0112 0.0073 0.0104* 0.0084* 0.0258** 0.0233**
(0.243) (0.377) (0.086) (0.071) (0.049) (0.031)
Risk 0.1255** 0.1182*** 0.0684** 0.0662*** 0.1519** 0.1401**
(0.011) (0.004) (0.021) (0.002) (0.020) (0.010)
Constant 0.3139 0.2512 0.1832 0.1291 0.3864 0.5824*
(0.388) (0.408) (0.422) (0.435) (0.270) (0.051)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
N 669 669 669 669 669 669
adj. R2 0.115 0.166 0.050 0.099 0.004 0.026
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% levels, and both White’s heteroskedasticity–robust procedure and the
cluster correction method are used. No collinearity problems are observed.
* Signiﬁcance at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1% level.
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sions are not substantively troubled by this explanation.
Table 9
Pre-reﬁnancing earnings management.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EMJS EMKS EMJS_d EMKS_d
Suc 0.0006 0.0190 0.1401 0.1847
(0.951) (0.216) (0.491) (0.392)
Size 0.0010 0.0023 0.0118 0.0432
(0.875) (0.794) (0.923) (0.733)
Grow 0.0040 0.0092 0.1516 0.0864
(0.698) (0.433) (0.165) (0.254)
Risk 0.0115 0.0111 0.2630 0.4997
(0.686) (0.773) (0.529) (0.258)
Constant 0.1043 0.1190 1.2005 0.1401
(0.465) (0.542) (0.650) (0.959)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
N 669 669 669 669
adj./Pseudo R2 0.070 0.108 0.0569 0.0734
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% levels, and both White’s heteroskedasticity–robust procedure and the
cluster correction method are used. Collinearity problems are not a concern.
* Signiﬁcance at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1% level.
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The results of the tests reported in the previous section validate our main ﬁnding that the post-reﬁnancing
performance of ﬁrms in the success sample is signiﬁcantly better than that of those in the failure sample, thus
supporting our conclusion that the reﬁnancing behavior of Chinese listed companies is not motivated by mis-
appropriation alone, but is most likely a rational choice made in full consideration of the costs and beneﬁts. If
this conclusion is indeed valid, then any cross-sectional diﬀerences in performance should be related to agency
costs and ﬁnancial constraints prior to the implementation of reﬁnancing. A company with low agency costs is
more likely to make use of an optimal ﬁnancing opportunity and thus the beneﬁts or losses associated with
whether its reﬁnancing behavior becomes a reality should be much greater. At the same time, the more ﬁnan-
cially constrained a ﬁrm is, the greater its ﬁnancing demands. Hence, regardless of whether its reﬁnancing ini-
tiative is successful, the associated beneﬁts or losses will be much greater. Following this line of thought, we
predict that if the reﬁnancing behavior of Chinese listed companies is more inclined to be a rational choice
made after balancing the costs and beneﬁts than it is to be a bid for misappropriation, then lower agency costs
or greater ﬁnancial constraints should result in greater cross-sectional diﬀerences in performance.
To test this prediction and provide further support for our ﬁndings, we build the following regression
model, Model (2), based on basic regression model (1) to determine the inﬂuence of agency costs and ﬁnancial
constraints on cross-sectional diﬀerences in performance.Perf ¼ b0 þ b1  Sucþ b2  acostðfcÞ þ b3  Suc  acostðfcÞ þ bj 
X
Controli;t þ fixed effectsþ g ð2Þ
where acost represents agency costs and fc represents ﬁnancial constraints, both using data for the year prior
to reﬁnancing (whether a success or failure). We consider agency costs by the extent to which a company has
been tunneled and, following Jiang et al. (2010), we calculate it as other receivables divided by tradable market
capitalization at the end of the year. With regard to ﬁnancial constraints, prior research has demonstrated that
in China, the longer a company has been established, the greater the ﬁnancial constraints that it faces, with
private ﬁrms facing greater ﬁnancial constraints than SOEs (Wang, 2009). We thus ﬁrst adopt the age of
the company and the ownership properties of the ultimate controlling shareholder as two single variables
to depict the level of ﬁnancial constraint a company faces prior to a reﬁnancing initiative. At the same time,
to overcome the inherent defects of these two single variables, we also calculate the widely used KZ index to
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the following equation to calculate the annual value of the KZ index for the sample ﬁrms.Table
Cross-
Suc
acost
Sucac
Age
Sucag
Owner
Sucow
KZ
SucK
Size
Grow
Risk
_cons
Year
Indust
N
adj. R
All co
cluster
Becaus
as the
* Sign
** Sign
*** SigKZ ¼ 1:002ðCF=KÞ þ 0:283ðQÞ þ 3:139ðDebt=CapitalÞ  39:368ðDiv=KÞ  1:315ðCash=KÞ;
where CF represents annual net cash ﬂow; K represents the value of ﬁxed assets at the end of the year; Q is the
Tobin’s Q ratio; Debt and Capital stand for year-end total liabilities and total equity, respectively; D is the
amount of cash dividends paid out; and Cash is the sum of cash and short-term investments. After calculations
according to this equation, the higher a company’s annual KZ index, the greater the ﬁnancial constraints it
suﬀers in that year.
Table 10 reports the regression results for Model (2). What we are most concerned with is the sign and sta-
tistical signiﬁcance of b3, which is the interaction between Suc and agency costs or ﬁnancial constraints. The
aim of regression (1) is to test the moderating eﬀects of agency costs. As Table 10 shows, an increase in agency
costs prior to reﬁnancing leads to a dramatic decrease in the cross-sectional diﬀerence between companies with
successful and failed reﬁnancing attempts. The regression coeﬃcient of the interaction term is signiﬁcantly
negative at the 5% level, which shows that among companies characterized by lower agency costs, the10
sectional diﬀerences in performance.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Perf Perf Perf Perf
0.0729*** 0.0385 0.0796*** 0.0398***
(0.000) (0.369) (0.000) (0.001)
0.0000
(0.852)
ost 0.0003**
(0.028)
0.0057**
(0.049)
e 0.0079**
(0.036)
0.0050
(0.787)
ner 0.0363*
(0.098)
0.0159***
(0.000)
Z 0.0068*
(0.097)
0.0136* 0.0104 0.0132** 0.0107*
(0.072) (0.134) (0.029) (0.075)
0.0331*** 0.0370*** 0.0375*** 0.0329***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
0.1062*** 0.1153*** 0.1052*** 0.0993***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.1274 0.0006 0.1395 0.0560
(0.388) (0.997) (0.316) (0.697)
Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
ry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
1332 1362 1362 1332
2 0.133 0.133 0.130 0.143
ntinuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% levels, and both White’s heteroskedasticity–robust procedure and the
correction method are used. Collinearity problems are not a concern. The results in this table use ROS as the dependent variable.
e some data is missing, the number of observations in regressions (1)–(4) decreases to 1332. The use of other performance measures
dependent variable leads to no substantial changes in our results.
iﬁcance at 10% level.
iﬁcance at 5% level.
niﬁcance at 1% level.
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aims of regressions (2), (3) and (4) are all to test the moderating eﬀects of ﬁnancial constraints. The results
show that increases in age and the KZ index lead to a dramatic rise in the cross-sectional diﬀerence between
successful and failed ﬁrms, whereas the results for SOEs are quite the opposite. There are more remarkable
cross-sectional diﬀerences between successful and failed ﬁrms among those facing greater ﬁnancial constraints
prior to a reﬁnancing application. To sum up, our investigation of the relationship between agency costs/
ﬁnancial constraints and cross-sectional performance diﬀerences conforms in full to our previous expectations.
This exercise thus provides further empirical support for our supposition that the reﬁnancing behavior of Chi-
nese listed companies is not oriented only toward the beneﬁts of misappropriation.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we reinvestigate the long-standing assumption that the reﬁnancing behavior of Chinese listed
companies is misappropriation-oriented. We argue that ﬁrm performance may decline in the wake of reﬁnanc-
ing, regardless of whether reﬁnancing took place for the purpose of misappropriation. Hence, it is inappropri-
ate to deduce from such underperformance that misappropriation was the sole purpose of the reﬁnancing
exercise. More importantly, it is noted in this paper that if the planned reﬁnancing is not implemented, ﬁrms’
post-reﬁnancing performance depends on their initial motivation for reﬁnancing, i.e. misappropriation or the
maximization of ﬁrm value. Although there are no companies that both succeed and fail in reﬁnancing, the
Chinese approval system serves as an exogenous force to divide companies with reﬁnancing plans into success
and failure samples. Because both types of ﬁrms have already met the CSRC’s threshold for reﬁnancing eli-
gibility, they share considerable similarities in terms of performance and motivation for and methods of reﬁ-
nancing. Hence, they serve as ideal references for one another. The CSRC approval system thus provides us
with a natural laboratory in which to compare the post-reﬁnancing performance of companies that were suc-
cessful in and failed to achieve their reﬁnancing plans and determine whether those plans were formulated for
misappropriation purposes. Our reasoning is as follows. If the post-reﬁnancing performance of the success
sample is signiﬁcantly inferior to that of the failure sample, then non-reﬁnancing improves performance,
and thus the planned reﬁnancing must have been motivated by misappropriation alone. If, in contrast,
non-reﬁnancing leads to poor ﬁrm performance, then the company’s motivation for reﬁnancing is unlikely
to have been misappropriation, but rather the maximization of ﬁrm value. In other words, the decision to reﬁ-
nance was a rational one made in full consideration of the costs and beneﬁts.
Using data from the Chinese A-share market during the 1998–2011 period, this paper demonstrates that the
reﬁnancing behavior of Chinese listed companies cannot be explained by misappropriation alone. We ﬁnd that
in the 3 years after a reﬁnancing intention is declared, ﬁrms that were successful in their reﬁnancing bids exhib-
ited signiﬁcantly superior performance to those that failed. This ﬁnding remains robust to implementation of a
series of tests carried out to ensure its reliability, namely, (1) the adoption of a variety of performance indi-
cators, including EVA; (2) controlling for the eﬀect of corporate governance; (3) using panel regression meth-
odology; and (4) reducing the length of the comparison period. We also consider two alternative explanations
for our ﬁndings. That is, our ﬁndings are the result of pre-reﬁnancing performance diﬀerences or diﬀerences in
pre-reﬁnancing earnings management. The tests of these alternative explanations produce little substantive
change in our research results, which indicates that our conclusions are robust. Finally, we also investigate
the relationship between agency costs or ﬁnancial constraints and cross-sectional performance diﬀerences.
We discover greater performance diﬀerences between the success and failure samples for companies with lower
agency costs or fewer ﬁnancial constraints, thus providing further support for our proposition that the reﬁ-
nancing behavior of Chinese listed ﬁrms is, on the whole, the result of a rational choice made in full consid-
eration of the costs and beneﬁts, rather than a desire to engage in misappropriation.
The reﬁnancing behavior of Chinese listed companies has long been thought to result from a desire to mis-
appropriate funds, an assumption that has exerted a highly negative inﬂuence on the resource redistribution
function of China’s capital markets. It is unsurprising that reﬁnancing behavior labeled as misappropriation
would prompt tougher regulatory supervision and result in higher ﬁnancing costs. The end result is a waste
of regulatory resources and the cancelation of many investment projects that could have created positive
ﬁrm value, undoubtedly leading to immeasurable economic losses. This paper thus has important policy
320 C. Liu, L. Sun / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 307–320implications, as its ﬁndings suggest the need for a reassessment of whether the reﬁnancing behavior of Chinese
listed companies is motivated by misappropriation alone. We argue here, and our ﬁndings demonstrate, that
we must distinguish legitimate reﬁnancing from misappropriation and return to an impartial stance when
evaluating the reﬁnancing behavior of Chinese listed ﬁrms. On this basis, we also argue for loosening of
the regulatory requirements governing reﬁnancing in China. Simpliﬁcation of the CRSC’s approval process
would further expand the development of China’s reﬁnancing markets and improve the eﬃciency of resource
redistribution in its capital markets.
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